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CRIMINAL LAW
THOMAS A. WILLS*
Since this article1 is a continuation of the previous Survey,2 the same
policies of selection will be used, and developments in various areas will be
presented as an integrated continuum.
SENTENCE
1. Deferment of Sentence by Trial Judge
The parole and probation statutes 3 passed in 1957 indirectly limit the
power of the trial judge to defer sentencing. It has been held that if the
maximum time for which a sentence could have been imposed has expired
between an adjudication of guilt and the actual passage of the sentence, the
trial court no longer has the power to sentence.4 This position was extended
by the supreme court as follows: "when a trial judge has delayed the sen-
tence the power to sentence must be exercised before the lapse of the
extreme period for which sentence could have been imposed, and when it is
inflicted the term cannot be projected beyond the extreme period." This
view was affirmed in a recent case0 in which the court upheld a delayed
sentence that would terminate within the extreme period.
11. Reduction of Sentence by Appellate Judge
After considerable controversy, the courts seem to have adopted the
view that an appellate court should not reduce a sentence which is within
the statutory limits. 7 This policy was applied recently in two rather unusual
situations. In one, reduction was denied when the penalty imposed for
conspiracy to commit the crime was greater than for the crime itself." In
the other, the defendant pled guilty to a rape charge. He was tried by a
judge, and thus there was no opportunity for a recommendation of mercy
by a jury. The supreme court refused to reduce the death sentence and
commented: "the extent of it [the sentence] cannot be reviewed on appeal
regardless of the existence or nonexistence of mitigating circumstances." 9
* Professor of Law, University of Miami.
1. This Survey includes cases reported in 113 So.2d 224 through 131 So.2d and
laws enacted by the 1961 General Session of the Florida Legislature.
2. Wills, Criminal Law Survey, 14 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521 (1960).
3. FLA. STAT. §§ 948.01-49.03 (1961).
4. Bateb v. State, 101 So.2d 869 (Fla. App. 1958).
5. State v. Bateh, 110 So.2d 7, 10 (Fla. 1959).
6. Rodriguez v. State, 119 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1960).
7. Stanford v. State, 110 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1959); Brown v. State, 13 So.2d 458
(Fla. 1943).
8. LePrell v. State, 124 So.2d 18 (Fla. App. 1960).
9. Davis v. State, 123 So.2d 703, 707 (Fla. 1960).
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III.. Indeterminate Sentence
The court upheld a sentence comprising four terms of six months to
ten years 0 and indicated that the possibility of decreasing the term from
the maximum does not make the sentence so indefinite as to be unconsti-
tutional. The statute permitting indeterminate sentences" was consistent
with general constitutional requirements, and sufficiently flexible to afford
individualized attention in accordance with modern concepts of penology
based upon deterrence and rehabilitation.
In another case involving the indeterminate sentencing provisions, '2
the court held that the statute should not be applied if the crime was
committed before the statute was enacted.' 3
ACCUSED AS A WITNESS
1. Comment by the Prosecution14
Although by statute the prosecution is prohibited from commenting
on the accused's failure to testify,15 the prosecuting attorney may refer to
the rule which provides that the recent unexplained possession of stolen
goods raises an inference of guilt. However, the courts have implied that
these two principles are not necessarily mutually exclusive.'0 In a recent
case in which the defendant did not testify, the following statements of
the prosecution were held to be error: " 'What has been the defense to
unexplained possession? Can you find, in anything the defendant has said,
which would give him an explanation for the possesion of this property on
January 30? Has he explained his possession in any way by his defense?' ",17
Perhaps the courts consider that a bare statement of the rule of "unex-
plained possession" is all that is necessary to inform the jury, and thus any
additional comment might be viewed as excessive and an infringement upon
the defendant's rights.
The extent to which ambiguities are construed in the defendant's favor
is illustrated by a case in which the defendant's attorney, in his opening
statement, announced that the defendant would testify and admit a criminal
10. Carneley v. Cochran, 118 So.2d 629 (Fla. 1960).
11. FLA. STAT. § 921.18 (1961).
12. FLA. STAT. §§ 921.17-.23 (1961).
13. Sing v. State, 115 So.2d 773 (Fla. App. 1959).
14. For an excellent analysis of the law in this area see Comment, 15 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 293 (1961).
15. FLA. STAT. § 918.09 (1961). "Accused may make himself a witness. - in all
criminal prosecutions the accused may at his option be sworn as a witness in his own
behalf, and shall in such case be subject to examination as other witnesses, but no accused
person shall be compelled to give testimony against himself, nor shall any prosecuting
attorney be permitted before the jury or court to comment on the failure of the accused
to testify in his own behalf, and a defendant offering no testimony in his own behalf,
except his own, shall be entitled to the concluding argument before the jury."
16. Ard v. State. 108 So.2d 38 (Fla. 1959).
17. Furci v. State, 113 So.2d 272, 273 (Fla. App. 1959). (Italicized in original.)
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record. The defendant did not testify. The prosecution stated that when
the defendant was arrested he claimed that he had never been arrested
previously. The prosecution then pointed out the conflict. The appellate
court held this vague and nebulous reference to be a comment on the
defendant's failure to testify because "a comment made by a prosecuting
attorney directly or indirectly which is subject to interpretation by a jury
as a comment upon failure to testify is an encroachment . . . regardless of
... the motive or intent, notwithstanding such comment is susceptible to a
different construction." '  A comment is error even though it was made
inadvertently in the heat of argument.19
On the other hand, when the defense counsel states that the defendant's
failure to testify is not evidence of guilt, rebuttal by the prosecution is
invited. Therefore, a reply that the failure is not evidence of innocence
is justified. 20
II. Self-incrimination
A defendant, not represented by counsel nor informed of his rights,
testified upon the trial judge's invitation. The judge had stated, "tell me any
statement you like now."''2 In reversing the conviction, the appellate court
held that knowledge of his rights against self-incrimination was a prerequisite
to waiver of that privilege.22
In Brizzie v. State23 the court applied the well known rule that refusal
to testify under the immunity statute24 is justified if the crime involved is
not covered by the statute, and held that the possession of stolen property
is not within its purview, even though the related crime of larceny is.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
The courts continue to give the state considerable latitude in the general
area of arrest and search, and are particularly liberal if automobiles25 are
involved. In one case, 20 in which the evidence was admitted when the
automobile in question was in "close proximity" to the place of arrest, the
court quoted the following language from Cameron v. State:27 "the modern
18. Otto v. State, 126 So.2d 152, 153 (Fla. App. 1961).
19. Milton v. State, 127 So.2d 460 (Fla. App. 1961); Sing v. State, 11; So.2d
771 (Fla. App. 1959).
20. Testasecca v. State, 115 So.2d 584 (Fla. App. 1959).
21. Cochran v. State, 117 So.2d 544, 545 (Fla. App. 1960).
22. Cochran v. State, supra note 21.
23. 120 So.2d 27 (Fla. App. 1960).
24. FLA. STAT. § 932.29 (1961).
25. This position toward automobiles is reflected in City of Miami v. Aronovitz,
114 So.2d 784 (Fla. 1959) wherein the establishment of road blocks in order to inspect
for drivers' licenses was unfortunately approved.
26. Herring v. State, 121 So.2d 807 (Fla. App. 1960).
27. 112 So.2d 864, 873 (Fla. App. 1959).
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trend of authority is to narrow the concept of immunity against search and
seizure when it involves a motor vehicle used as an aid in the commission
of crime."
It had been previously decided that when the defendant was arrested
for vagrancy in order to search for evidence of a bolita violation, the evidence
obtained was admissible. The rationale of the court was that the arrest
for vagrancy was not just a ruse since the defendant was charged with and
convicted of vagrancy.28 In a recent parallel case this policy was extended
to admit evidence of possession of burglary tools even though the defendant
was acquitted on the vagrancy charge. 29
The state's power relative to search warrants was restricted in the
context of jurisdictional and time requirements. When the property searched
was beyond the jurisdiction of the issuing magistrate, the warrant was invalid
even though the appropriate magistrate was unavailable for a fifteen day
period.3 0  A lapse of six months between the alleged observation of the
offense by the affiant and the execution of the affidavit was held to be
excessive and invalidated the warrant.8 1
CHARGE TO THE JURY
An important, controversial question concerning charges to the jury
was reviewed, analyzed and evaluated by the courts. According to section
919.14 of the Florida Statutes, 32 the court shall in all cases charge the jury
as to the degrees of the offense.33  However, section 918.10(4) of the
Florida Statutes 3 4 provides that no party shall assign as error or grounds
for appeal the giving or failing to give an instruction unless he has made
appropriate objection. The latter statute is qualified by a case35 which held
that if the failure to charge is "fundamental error" then a new trial is
justified. Therefore, resolution of a particular problem would depend upon
the definition of "fundamental error." In Hamilton v. State,3 6 the court
indicated that an error is not fundamental "unless it reaches down into the
legality of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not
have been obtained without the assistance of the error alleged."3 7  Thus,
it- seems that there is no rule relative to categories of charges, rather each
28. Blake v. State, 112 So.2d 391 (Fla. App. 1959).
29. Rinehart v. State, 114 So.2d 487 (Fla. App. 1959).
30. Robinson v. State, 124 So.2d 714 (Fla. App. 1960).
31. Hamelmann v. State, 113 So.2d 394 (Fla. App. 1959).
32. FLA. STAT. § 919.14 (1961).
33. For various applications of this view see Pait v. State, 112 So.2d 380 (Fla.
1959) and Killen v. State, 92 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1957).
34. FLA. STAT. § 918.10(4) (1961).
35. Hlarrison v. State, 5 So.2d 703 (Fla. 1942). This court used the expression
"tremendous interest" rather thin "fundamental error."
36. 88 So.2d 606 (Fla. 1956).
37. Id. at 607.
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decision requires evaluation of the particular circumstances by means of
the definition.
The problem of the apparent conflict between sections 919.14 and
918.10 arose in a trial in which the defendant was charged with first degree
and convicted of second degree murder. There was no evidence presented
relative to murder in the third degree and the trial judge charged that
murder in the third degree was not applicable. The defendant's attorney
did not object to this charge, request a charge as to third degree murder, or
set forth either point in a motion for a new trial. The district court of
appeal said: "We again state our holding in the instant case that failure
to instruct on third degree homicide when no evidence is presented as to
such crime is not a fundamental error when no request has been made by
the defendant for such instruction and when the failure to so instruct is
not set forth in the defendant's motion for new trial. 381 Subsequently,
on certiorari, the supreme court upheld the decision.3 9
The other side of the controversy was ably expressed in a dissenting
opinion by Justice Drew. He considered that section 919.14 of the Florida
Statutes makes the obligation to charge absolute. Therefore, it should not
be necessary to decide that the error is "fundamental." He further pointed
out that section 924.32(1) of the Florida Statutes40 and rule 6.16(a) of the
Florida Appellate Rules give the court discretionary power to consider errors
in instructions whether objected to or not. The discretion is exercised if
the "interest of justice" requires, rather than on the basis of a definitional
determination of whether the error is "fundamental" or not. In his opinion
the "interest of justice" indicated a new trial. He expressed his view
as follows:
In the trial of a criminal case the jury has the unquestioned power
under our laws to find a defendant not guilty irrespective of the
evidence and such verdict of not guilty is one of the few untouch-
able things in the law. For a court to instruct a jury in positive
terms, as was done here, that they did not have the power to find
a defendant charged with murder in the first degree guilty of
murder in the third degree is a plain and gross error of incalculable
harm in the eyes of the law to the defendant and one which should
be considered by an appellate court on review even though it be
presented for the first time in that court or be discovered by that
court in its examination of the record. 4 1
38. State v. Brown, 118 So.2d 574, 582 (Fla. App. 1960). The trial judge not
only failed to instruct as to third degree murder, but he also positively stated that murder
in the third degree was not applicable; this fact seemed to be ignored by the majority of
the appellate judges. This position was extended in White v. State, 122 So.2d 340 (Fla.
App. 1960) which involved a similar situation wherein the defendants' attorney orally
requested a charge on murder in the third degree, but failed to submit written instructions
or to object to the failure to charge.
39. Brown v. State, 124 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1960).
40. FLA. STAT. § 924.32(l) (1961).
41. Brown v. State, 124 So.2d 481, 487 (Fla. 1960).
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Justice Drew dissented in Jefferson v. State4 2 for the same reason. He
raised the issue again in Johnson v. State.41 He considered that since his
view had been twice rejected, the majority position must be taken as the
law in Florida. He, therefore, reluctantly concurred in affirming a convic-
tion without a recommendation of mercy when the judge had not instructed
on homicide in the third degree. The writer agrees emphatically with
Justice Drew.
In a related problem in which there was no request for a specific charge
on justifiable homicide, nor objection to the charge given, the conviction
was reversed and a new trial ordered, because the instruction omitted an
essential element. The court said "that it is fundamental that when the
trial judge purports to give a charge on justifiable homicide, then every
essential elements of justifiable homicide, justified by any of the evidence,
should be given." 44
In a lottery case, 45 the charge involved multiple errors. After prolonged
deliberation, the jury requested a definition of the word "possession." The
trial judge's response included the following language: " 'Whether or not
the accused, or any of them, were in conscious and substantial possession
of the things alleged to have been found in the premises said to have been
owned by the defendants Diecidue, may be lawfully inferred by the sur-
rounding circumstances, especially in the absence of contrary or exculpatory
evidence.' "40 The supreme court" granted a new trial because it found
that this challenged charge was defective. The charge amounted to a
reference in the presence of the jury to the fact that the defendant did not
testify, without further charging that this fact must not be weighed against
him. Since the prohibition in section 918.09 of the Florida Statutes48
refers to the prosecuting attorney not the judge, the charge is not in violation
of the statute. Nevertheless, the charge was held to be fundamental error
because a reference by the judge may be even more damaging to the rights
of the defendant than a reference by the prosecution. Further, the charge
suggested the opinion of the case held by the judge, and as such was in
conflict with the concept of the presumption of innocence until guilt is
established beyond a reasonable doubt, and of a fair and impartial trial
by a jury of peers.
FAIR TRIAL
1. Right to an Attorney
The defendant's attorney was allowed to withdraw from the case five
42. 128 So.2d 132 (Fla. 1961).
43. 130 So.2d 599 (Fla. 1961 ).
44. Bagley v. State, 119 So.2d 400, 403 (Fla. App. 1960).
45. Diecidue v. State, 131 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1961).
46. Id. at 10.
47. Diecidue %'. State. 131 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1961).
48. See note 15 supra.
[VOL. XVI
CRIMINAL LAW
days before the trial in an ex parte hearing for which the defendant was not
given notice, was not present, and had no opportunity to object or be heard.
The defendant's request for a continuance in order to obtain new counsel
was denied. The supreme court 49 ordered a new trial on the basis that
section 11 of the Declaration of Rights in the Florida Constitution, which
specifically provides that the defendant has a right to procure an attorney,
also necessarily implies that reasonable time for this purpose and for the
preparation of a defense will be afforded. The court concluded that the
refusal would also constitute a denial of the due process requirements of the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and made
the interesting observation that an opposite view might tend to cause more
encroachments on state sovereignty.
II. Trial by Jury
The supreme court recently reaffirmed the general view that sections
3 and 11 of the Declaration of Rights in the Florida Constitution do not
require jury trials in municipal courts for violations of municipal ordinances,
and specifically held that the defendant was not entitled to a jury trial in
the metropolitan courts on a charge of drunken driving.50
III. Miscellaneous
It is not necessary for the state to identify the person who supplied
information that supported a search warrant when that person was neither
a participant in the alleged crime nor a material witness. 51
The court on the basis of authority from other jurisdictions, decided
that the defendant had a fair trial even though the court reporter was com-
mittcd to a mental hospital before he had transcribed the notes, and even
though the trial judge died after the appeal had been filed.5 2
JURISDICTION
The district court of appeal in Campbell v. County of Dade5 3 decided
that when the defendant appeared before the trial court in response to
charges contained in the docket entry, the alleged illegality of the arrest
did not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court to hear and determine the
charges. This decision was subsequently misunderstood and misapplied in
the metropolitan court in denying a motion to suppress evidence obtained
49. Cash v. Culver, 122 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1960), noted in 15 U. MIAMI L. REV.
323 (1961). See also Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633 (1959); Cash v. Culver, 120 So.2d
590 (Fla. 1960).
50. Boyd v. County of Dade, 123 So.2d 323 (Fla. 1960).
51. State v: Hardy, 114 So.2d 344 (Fla. App.. 1959).
52. Burton v. State, 128 So.2d 765 (Fla. App. 196l).
53. 113 So.2d 708 (Fla. App. 1959).
19611
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
after an arrest alleged to be illegal. The defendant's subsequent oral motion
to quash was denied, and the defendant appealed his conviction. The
circuit court held that the metropolitan court had jurisdiction, noted that
the metropolitan court had misapplied the Campbell case relative to the
motion to supress, but held that the error was not preserved for appeal
since the defendant did not object to the introduction of the evidence during
the trial. The district court of appeal denied certiorari even though the
illegality of the arrest could affect the admissibility of evidence, because the
motion to quash did not put the legality of the arrest into issue. 4
Some persons in the legal profession believe that many members of the
general public have little respect for the courts, lawyers and "the law."
Results of the sort reported leave impressions that are very difficult to
overcome.
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Contra to the implication in section 901.23 of the Florida Statutes,55
a preliminary hearing has been held not to be a necessary component of a
valid criminal prosecution."" This view was approved and applied in a
recent case, in which the appellate court affirmed a conviction in which
the defendant had been taken into custody without a warrant, questioned,
subsequently arrested and denied a preliminary hearing. 57
NEW OR UNUSUAL POINTS
I. Bail
On appeal from the district court to the supreme court the defendant
may be entitled to bail if certain requirements,5 such as the fact that the
appeal was made in good faith, are met. The district court50 has decided
that it has jurisdiction to determine good faith for purposes of bail, but
indicated that a better procedure would be to present the question to the
supreme court.00
54. Jones v. State, 123 So.2d 385 (Fla. App. 1960).55. FLA. STAT. § 901.23 (1961). "Duty of Officer after arrest without warrant.
An officer who has arrested a person without a warrant, shall without unnecessary delay
take the person arrested before the nearest or most accessible magistrate in the county
in which the arrest occurs, having jurisdiction, and shall make before the magistrate a
complaint, which shall set forth the facts showing the offense for which the person was
arrested; or, if that magistrate is absent or unable to act, before the nearest or most acces-
sible magistrate in the same county."
56. Rouse v. State, 44 Fla. 148, 32 So. 784 (1902).
57. DiBona v. State, 121 So.2d 192 (Fla. App. 1960).
58. For an additional discussion of the requirements see Younghans v. State, 90
So.2d 308 (Fla. 1956).
59. Harrington v. State, 114 So.2d 217 (Fla. App. 1959).
60. Also note that FLA. App. R. 4.3(c) (6) provides that the filing of-a petition
for certiorari acts as a stay of proceedings in the district court and thus the defendant may
be entitled to bail. Bedami v. State, 115 So.2d 412 (Fla. 1959).
[VOL. XVI
CRIMINAL LAW
II. Nolle Prosequi
When a nolle prosequi has been filed against the information, an order
reinstating the bond does not reinstate the information.61
III. Subornation of Perjury
The Florida rule with respect to proof of perjury is that the elements
must be proved by two witnesses or one witness and independent corrob-
orating circumstances. s 2  In a case involving subornation of perjury, in the
absence of Florida precedent, the court13 cited federal authority 4 to the
effect that one witness was sufficient, and held that denial of a requested
instruction that two witnesses or one witness and corroborating circumstances
were required was not error.
IV. Insanity
A very small dent was put in the armor of the M'Naghten Rule
when one judge, dissenting in part from a decision affirming a conviction
and death sentence, considered that the time had come to re-examine the
test for sanity.6 5 The writer wholeheartedly agrees.66
When a defendant is adjudicated insane, and subsequently released
from the hospital with a discharge certificate, he should be presumed to
remain insane until adjudicated sane under section 917.01(2) of the Florida
Statutes.67 Therefore, in a prosecution for a crime committed in the interim
he is entitled to an instruction setting forth this presumption.6 8
V. Sale of Land by a Public Officer
In State v. Hooten 9 the court held section 839.09 of the Florida
Statutes70 applicable to the sale of land to the county by a county commis-
sioner who had an ownership interest in the land. The case is interesting
because the point was new in Florida, and because the court employed the
unusual procedure of citing civil cases as authority.
61. State v. Newell, 117 So.2d 752 (Fla. App. 1960).
62. Rader v. State, 52 So.2d 105 (Fla. 1951)_; Keiv v. State, 152 Fla. 389, 11 So.2d
886 (1943).
63. Gordon v. State, 119 So.2d 753 (Fla. App. 1960).
64. Doan v. United States, 202 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1953).
65. Piccott v. State, 116 So.2d 626. 630 (Fla. 1959).
66. For recent related articles see Cohen, Criminal Responsibility and the Knowledge
of Right and Wrong, 14 U. MIAMI L. REV. 30 (1959); Reid, The Working of the New
Hampshire Doctrine of Criminal Insanity, 15 U. MIAmI L. REV. 14 (1960); Block, Tem-
porary Insanity - First Line of Defense. 15 U. MIANvr L. REV. 392 (1961).
67. FLA. STAT. . 917.01(2) (1961).
68. Johnson v. State. 118 So.2d 234 (Fla. App. 1960).
69. 122 So.2d 336 (Fla. App. 1960).
70. FLA. STAT. § 839.09 (1961). "Boards not to purchase supplies from members
of boards.-No state or county board or municipal board or council shall purchase supplies,
goods or materials for public use from any firm or corporation in which any member of
1961]
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WORTHLESS CHECKS
The problems relating to the statutory provisions concerning worthless
checks were analyzed by the courts during the period surveyed. However,
the reader should note that the Florida Legislature in its 1961 session
amended the statute so that many of the problems that arose in the past
are now moot.
7 1
I. Problems Prior to the 1961 Amendment
In one case 72 the defendant issued a worthless check of 100 dollars.
The state made no allegation that the defendant received anything of value
in exchange for the check. He was convicted of a misdemeanor under the
appropriate section of the Florida Statutes.7 3 The rationale was based on
the statutory section (amended in 1961) which stated that "any persons
violating provisions of this section shall be punished in the same manner
as provided for by law for punishment for the crime of larceny."7 4
The larceny statutes, sections 811.021(2) and (3) of the Florida
Statutes 75 distinguished between a felony and a misdemeanor on the basis
of the value of the property stolen. When the defendant receives nothing
such board is either directly or indirectly interested, nor shall any such board pay for
such supplies, goods or materials so purchased. Any person violating the provisions of
this section shall be punished, upon conviction, by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars
or imprisonment not exceeding one year; provided, that no member of any board afore-
said who shall have recorded his vote against such illegal purchase, or who shall have
been absent at the taking of the vote thereon, shall be convicted of a violation of this
section."
71. The amendment abrogates the relationship that existed between the penalty
for larceny and the issuance of a worthless check. (See text at note 74 infra.) The
statute now provides specific penalties for violation of its provisions. Fla. Laws 1961,
ch 61-284 amends FLA. STAT. § 832.05(2) (1959) as follows: "Violation of the pro-
visions of the subsection shall constitute a misdemeanor and shall be punishable by
imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six (6) months or by fine not exceeding
three hundred dollars ($300.00), unless the check, draft or other written order drawn,
made, uttered, issued or delivered be in the amount of fifty dollars ($50.00), or its
equivalent, or more and the payee or a subsequent holder thereof receives something of
value therefor. In that event the violation shall constitute a felony and shall be punish-
able by imprisonment in the state penitentiary not exceeding five (5) years, or in the
the county jail not exceeding twelve (12) months, or by fine not exceeding one thousand
dollars ($1,000.00)." It also amends FLA. STA'r. § 832.05(3) (1959) as follows: "Vio-
lation of the provisions of this subsection shall, if the check, draft or other written order
be for an amount less than fifty dollars ($50.00) or its equivalent, constitute a misde-
meanor and shall be punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six (6)
months or by fine not exceeding three hundred dollars ($300.00). Violation of the
provisions of this subsection shall, if the check, draft or other written order be in the
amount of fifty dollars ($50.00), or its equivalent, or more, constitute a felony and be
punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary not exceeding five (5) years, or in
the county jail not exceeding twelve (12) months, or by fine not exceeding one thousand
dollars ($1,000.00)." FLA. STAT. § 832.05 (1959) was further amended by Fla. Laws
1961, ch. 61-185 to provide that if the case were dismissed for want of prosecution, the
costs must be paid by the person who applied for the warrant.
72. State v. Culver, 113 So.2d 383 (Fla. 1959).
73. Fla. Laws 1953, ch. 28096, § 1(2), at 306.
74. Fla. Laws 1953, ch. 28096, § 1(6)(a), at 308.
75. FLA. STAT. §§ 811.021(2), (3) (1961).
CRIMINAL LAW
of value for the worthless check, there is nothing which corresponds to
"property stolen." Therefore, the conviction could not be for a felony and
thus would have to be considered as a misdemeanor under section 775.08
of the Florida Statutes 76 and punished according to section 775.07 of the
Florida Statutes.77 This position has been followed and the defendant
released when he had already served a term longer than section 775.07
provides. 7
When the defendant receives something of value in exchange for the
check, the appropriate section is 832.05(3) of the Florida Statutes.7 9  Relat-
ing the appropriate provisions, 0 prior to the 1961 amendment,," the crime
would be a felony if the value were 100 dollars or over.82
II. A Problem That Remains After Passage of the 1961: Amendment
The determination of the meaning and application of the requirement
that the worthless check must be given in exchange for something of value
is a current problem not resolved by the new legislation. 3 Courts have
reversed convictions when the worthless check was given as part payment
of a pre-existing debt for work and materials, 8 4 and when the check was for
labor alone.85  In the latter case the court indicated that the defendant
76. FLA. STAT. § 775.08 (1961). "Felonies and misdemeanors defined. - Any
crime punishable by death, or imprisonment in the state prison, is a felony, and no
other crime shall be so considered. Every other offense is a misdemeanor."
77. FLA. STAT. § 775.07 (1961). "Punishment for misdemeanors where not
otherwise provided. - The punishment for commission of crimes other than felonies in
this state, when not otherwise provided by statute, or when the penalty provided by such
statute is ineffectual because of constitutional provisions, or because the same is otherwise
illegal or void, shall be a fine not exceeding two hundred dollars or imprisonment not
exceeding ninety days; and where punishment by fine alone is provided the court may,
in his discretion, sentence the defendant to serve not exceeding sixty days in default of
the payment of the said fine."
78. State v. Cochran, 115 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1959); Greer v. Culver, 113 So.2d 386
(Fla. 1959).
79. FLA. STAT. § 832.05(3) (1961). "Obtaining Property In Return For Worth-
less Checks, Etc.; Penalty. - It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation
to obtain any services, goods, wares or other things of value by means of a check, draft
or other written order upon any bank, person, firm or corporation, knowing at the time
of the making, drawing, uttering, issuing or delivering of said check or draft that the
maker thereof has not sufficient funds on deposit in or credit with such bank or deposi-
tory with which to pay the same upon presentation, provided however that no crime
may be charged in respect to the giving of any such check or draft or other written order
where the payee knows or has been expressly notified or has reason to believe that the
drawer did not have on deposit or to his credit with the drawee sufficient funds to
insure payment thereof."
80. See Fla. Laws 1953, ch. 28096, § 1(6)(a), at 308 and FLA. STAT. §
811.021(2) (1961).
81. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-284.
82. Penrod v. Cochran, 123 So.2d 334 (Fla. 1960).
83. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-284. "It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or
corporation to obtain any services, goods, wares or other things of value by means of a
check, draft or other written order upon any bank, person, firm or corporation
(Emphasis added.)
84. Harris v. State, 123 So.2d 572 (Fla. App. 1960).
85. Helms v. State, 128 So.2d 756 (Fla. App. 1961).
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could be convicted under section 832.05(2) of the Florida Statutes86 for
a misdemeanor 8 7
ESCAPE
If the defendant escapes from confinement for civil contempt, he can
not be prosecuted under section 944.40 of the Florida Statutes,88 because
this statute only applies to escape from confinement for either misdemeanors
or felonies.8 9 In habeas corpus proceedings, the court managed to remand
the case to try the defendant for escape by resorting to section 2.01 of the
Florida Statutes90 so that the common law derived from England relating
to lawful confinement, generally, could be invoked.
HOMICIDE
The general rule that a confession or admission standing alone is insuf-
ficient to establish the elements of the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable
doubt was given an interesting interpretation in a homicide case.01 The
defendant claimed that when charged with murder in the first degree, the
corpus delicti is not proved beyond a reasonable doubt unless the confession
is coupled with the independent evidence which must establish either pre-
meditation or commission of one of the felonies under the felony rule. The
court disagreed and, citing a New York case, 2 held that the criminal agency
element of the corpus delicti could be satisfied by coupling the confession
with proof of circumstances that would amount to homicide in any degree.
OBSCENE LITERATURE
The constitutionality of section 847.01 of the Florida Statutes3 has
86. FLA. STAT. § 832.05(2) (1961). "Worthless Checks. - It shall be unlawful
for any person, finn or corporation to draw. make, utter, issue or deliver to another any
check, draft, or other written order on any bank or depository for the payment of monev
or its equivalent, knowing at the time of the drawing, making, uttering, issuing or deliv-
ering such check or draft that the maker or drawer thereof has not sufficient funds on
deposit in or credit with such bank or depository with which to pay the same on pres-
entation; provided, that this section shall not apply to any check where the payee or
holder knows or has been expressly notified prior to the drawing or uttering of same or
has reason to believe that the drawer did not have on deposit or to his credit with the
drawee sufficient funds to insure payment as aforesaid, nor shall this section apply to any
post dated check."
87. Helms v. State, 128 So.2d 756 (Fla. App. 1961). A judge of one of the
courts posed the following question. If a person bought property valued in excess of
$100.00 would he limit possible prosecution to a misdemeanor by charging the property
and issuing a worthless check on a subsequent day for the "pre-existing" debt?
88. FLA. STAT. § 944.40 (1961).
89. Duscksworth v. Boyer, 125 So.2d 844 (Fla. 1960).
90. FLA. SrAT. § 2.01 (1959). "Common law and certain statutes declared in
force. - The common and statute laws of England which are of a general and not a
local nature, with the exception hereinafter mentioned, down to the fourth day of July,
1776, are declared to be of force in this state; provided, the said statutes and common
law be not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United States and the acts
of the legislature of this state."
91. Jefferson v. State, 128 So.2d 132 (Fla. 1961).
92. People v. Lytton, 257 N.Y. 310, 178 N.E. 290 (1931).
93. Fla. Laws 1955, ch. 29849, § 1, at 698.
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been unsuccessfully attacked on the basis of infringement upon freedom of
speech, and upon failure to provide sufficient standards of guilt. 4  The
statute has since been revisedy 5
According to Rachleff v. Mahon,96 it is proper for the county solicitor
to bring an action for a declaratory judgment to determine whether certain
publications are obscene in order to decide whether chapter 847 of the
Florida Statutes97 would apply. The court approved the test of obscenity
proposed in Roth v. United States98 ("whether to the average person, apply-
ing contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interests") and decided that the judge
could determine the issue without a jury, and without receiving testimony
of witnesses as evidence of contemporary community standards.
Scienter or knowledge of the obscene character of the literature is an
"essential element" in the sense that a charge by the trial judge that the
state need not prove scienter is reversible error.0 However, it is not an "essen-
tial element" in the sense that if omitted from the information, this defect
can be waived by failing to move to quash, and the error cannot be put
in issue for the first time on appeal. 100
EVIDENCE
The law regulating the admissibility of evidence concerning previous
crimes and convictions has been somewhat ambiguous. In a recent case
the court thoroughly reviewed the problem and affirmed the view that this
evidence is not admissible if the sole purpose is to reflect upon the character
of the defendant,' 0' but is admissible if relevant to the issues in point. 10 2
During the period under survey this policy was applied in two cases103 in
which the defendants shot and killed police officers who were attempting
to arrest them. Evidence tending to show that the defendants had com-
mitted prior burglaries and thus were apprehensive of capture was admitted
as relevant to the motive. Also, evidence of a previous robbery was admitted
in a murder trial because the murder occurred during a robbery involving a
similar scheme. 104 In an arson case, the court excluded mere accusations
94. Tracey v. State, 130 So.2d 605 (Fla. 1961); Cohen v. State, 125 So.2d 560(Fla. 1960).
95. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-7.
96. 124 So.2d 878 (Fla. App. 1960).
97. FLA. STAT. ch. 847 (1961).
98. 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
99. Cohen v. State, 125 So.2d 560 (Fla. 1960).
100. Tracey v. State, 130 So.2d 605 (Fla. 1961).
101. Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959).
102. This view has been supported. See Ross v. State, 112 So.2d 69 (Fla. App.
1959).
103. Johnson v. State, 130 So.2d 599 (Fla. 1961); Machiewitz v. State, 114 So.2d
684 (Fla. 1959).
104. Griffen v. State, 124 So.2d 38 (Fla. App. 1960).
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of previous acts of arson which were not specifically expressed nor sufficiently
connected to the arson charged.1 0 5
A very interesting modification of the policy occurred in a murder case
in which the trial court considered that evidence of a robbery and shooting
which occurred one month after the homicide for which the defendant was
on trial was relevant to the identity of the defendant, the weapon and to
the similarity of pattern. 106 However, the court in reversing and remanding
for a new trial, qualified the application of the relevancy test as follows:
In the present case we are convinced that the testimony about the
subsequent crime was so disproportionate to the issues of sameness
of the perpetrator and weapon and of design that it may well have
influenced the jury to find a verdict resulting in the death penalty
while a restriction of that testimony might have resulted in a recom-
mendation of mercy, a verdict of guilty of murder of a lesser degree
or even a verdict of not guilty. 10 7
LEGISLATION
The legislature made relatively few changes in this area during the
survey period. Those revisions which involved penalties were heretofore
discussed in reference to the larceny statutes. 08
I. Witnesses
Section 942.02(2) of the Florida Statutes °u provides that a judge of a
court of record may issue a summons directing a witness to attend a trial
in another state if, among other limitations, "the laws of the state in
which the prosecution is pending, or grand jury investigation has commenced
or is about to commence [and of any other state through which the witness
may be required to pass by ordinary course of travel], will give him protec-
tion from arrest and the service of civil and criminal process . . ." The
protection of the witness has been reduced by the deletion of the provision
enclosed in the brackets."0
II. Rape
It has been held that previous unchaste conduct could be used as a
defense to statutory rape when the parties had had intercourse with each
other previously (within the statute of limitations) but without the juris-
diction,"' but not when the previous intercourse was within the jurisdic-
105. Hooper v. State, 115 So.2d 769 (Fla. App. 1959).
106. Williams v. State, 117 So.2d 473 (Fla. 1960).
107. Id. at 476.
108. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
109. FLA. STAT. § 942.02(2) (1961).
110. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-491.
111. State v. Capps, 98 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1957).
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tion.112  This rather odd situation may have had something to do with
the amendment 113 to section 794.05 of the Florida Statutes to provide that:
"It shall not be a defense .. . that the prosecuting witness was not of
previous chaste character at the time of the act when the lack of previous
chaste character in the prosecuting witness was caused solely by previous
intercourse between the defendant and the prosecuting witness."
114
112. Hunter v. State, 85 Fla. 91, 95 So. 115 (1923).
113. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-109.
114. FLA. STAT. § 794.05(2) (1961).
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